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Abstract
To meet the ever-growing need for performance in sili-
con devices, SoC providers have been increasingly relying
on software-hardware cooperation. By controlling hardware
resources such as power or clock management from the soft-
ware, developers earn the possibility to build more flexible and
power efficient applications. Despite the benefits, these hard-
ware components are now exposed to software code and can
potentially be misused as open-doors to jeopardize trusted
environments, perform privilege escalation or steal crypto-
graphic secrets. In this work, we introduce SideLine, a novel
side-channel vector based on delay-line components widely
implemented in high-end SoCs. After providing a detailed
method on how to access and convert delay-line data into
power consumption information, we demonstrate that these
entities can be used to perform remote power side-channel
attacks. We report experiments carried out on two SoCs from
distinct vendors and we recount several core-vs-core attack
scenarios in which an adversary process located in one pro-
cessor core aims at eavesdropping the activity of a victim
process located in another core. For each scenario, we demon-
strate the adversary ability to fully recover the secret key of
an OpenSSL AES running in the victim core. Even more
detrimental, we show that these attacks are still practicable
if the victim or the attacker program runs over an operating
system.
1 Introduction
The need for direct physical access to a target to perform
a hardware attack was recently proved obsolete. Software-
exposed hardware mechanisms implemented to improve SoC
performance (mixed signal circuits, Field Programmable Gate
Array (FPGA), accelerators, etc.) or power consumption (dy-
namic voltage-frequency regulators) were shown to be sus-
ceptible to remote hijacking by attackers seeking to perform
fault injection or Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs).
Since 2014, and the Rowhammer vulnerability’s disclo-
sure [19], the remote attack threat has become prevalent in
hardware security researches. As a matter of fact, the influx of
connected devices associated with the multiplication of cloud
services offers a new playing field for attackers. Moreover,
despite the appearance of trusted entities (ARM TrustZone,
Intel SGX) that testify a growing need for SoC security, the
hardware threat remains underestimated.
Between 2014 and today, Rowhammer capability evolved
from random bit flips generation to privilege escalation on
remote devices [17, 22, 40]. Meanwhile, the CLKSCREW ex-
ploit demonstrated that power and clock glitch attacks can
be launched from within an ARM SoC using software pro-
grammable voltage-frequency regulators [36]. Recently, this
attack was improved [32] and deployed on Intel SGX de-
vices [18, 27]. From a side-channel point of view, two novel
families of remote attacks have been introduced. On the
one hand, micro-architectural timing attacks with Meltdown-
Spectre [20, 25], Foreshadow (SGX) [37] and more recently
MDS exploits [7, 38]. These attacks leverage speculative and
out-of-order execution in modern processors to steal secret
data from victim processes. On the other hand, remote power
SCAs have been introduced through several works on FPGA
devices. Through the implementation of sensors inside a
multi-user FPGA fabric, it was demonstrated that an adver-
sary can eavesdrop the activity of the other users [34]. On
heterogeneous SoCs, that employ both CPUs and FPGAs, [43]
and [15] respectively proved the possibility for an attacker
located in the FPGA fabric to eavesdrop the CPU power con-
sumption and to perform statistical SCAs. More recently,
remote power SCAs have been extended to microcontroller
devices using the ADCs they embedded to record an image
of their power consumption [13, 30]. This spreads further the
threats posed by remote SCAs from FPGA fabrics to general
purpose microcontrollers as those found in usual connected
devices.
In this paper we introduce SideLine, a novel side-channel
vector based on the intentional misuse of hardware resources
available in high-end SoC devices. SideLine leverages delay-
lines components embedded in SoCs that use external mem-
ory; it neither requires embedded reconfigurable logic (FPGA)
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Figure 1: Local power SCA uses voltage probes connected to
the target power pads in order to eavesdrop a leakage from a
victim process (green)
Figure 2: Remote power SCA leverages the target’s resources
(FPGA, ADC and here DLL or delay-block) to monitor the
victim process leakage without requiring physical access.
nor analog circuitry (ADC). Two delay-line blocks namely
delay-locked-loop and programmable delay-block are hi-
jacked to perform voltage measurements and maliciously used
to conduct power SCAs on application processors (AP) and
microcontrollers units (MCU). SideLine makes it possible
for an attacker to perform software-induced hardware attacks
without direct physical access to the target. Our contributions
are listed below:
• We reveal that delay-line-based components available in
a broad range of SoCs that employ external memories
can be turned into power consumption measurement
units.
• We describe three attacker-victim (core-vs-core) delay-
line-based SCA scenarios over two modern SoC devices:
AP-vs-AP attack (Dual Cortex-A9),AP-vs-MCU attack
and MCU-vs-AP attack (Dual Cortex-A7 + Cortex-M)
where AP and MCU respectively denote the application
processor and the microcontroller.
• For each scenario a correlation power analysis attack is
conducted against the publicly available OpenSSL AES
encryption algorithm and the full secret key is success-
fully recovered. The attack feasibility is demonstrated
on bare metal and Linux OS-based applications.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
section 2, we provide background information on power SCAs
and describe the state-of-the-art. In section 3, we introduce
delay-lines and their applications in SoC devices. Then, we
present the tested processors and the associated threat model
in section 4. Sections 5 and 6 are dedicated to the deployment
of the three attack scenarios. Finally, we discuss performance,
limitations, countermeasures in section 7 and conclude in
section 8.
2 Background
A remote power SCA can be seen as a fully integrated version
of the traditional SCA in which the attacked process, the
voltage probe and the oscilloscope are all located inside the
same device (as depicted in Figure 2). Thus, despite the fact
that a remote attack uses a different way to eavesdrop power
consumption, it uses the same side-channel analysis principles
and statistical tools. This section reminds the general power
side-channel background, the techniques recently introduced
to monitor voltage fluctuations from inside a device and the
related works.
2.1 Power Side-Channel Attacks
A power SCA makes use of transistors switching activity
leakage through power consumption variations to collect in-
formation about the processes running inside a target device.
Thanks to the correlation that exists between this leakage and
the processed data, an attacker may try to launch an SCA
to recover secret data or cryptographic keys from a target
device. Traditional power SCAs monitor the voltage varia-
tions induced by the target through a resistor attached to its
power pads [21]. Simply by analysing the collected traces, an
attacker can visually speculate on the different instructions ex-
ecuted by the target using a so-called Simple Power Analysis
(SPA [21]) attack. Such SPA was proved effective to recover
the private key used by asymmetric encryption algorithms
like RSA or ECC [39]. Differential Power Analysis [21] and
Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) [4] use statistical tools to
infer secret keys by correlating guessed leakage hypotheses
with a set of experimental traces. The success of the attack
depends on numerous parameters that will impact the signal-
to-noise ratio such as the presence of countermeasures, the
ability to synchronize the power consumption traces and the
quality of the reverse engineering steps.
Traditionally, power SCAs are carried out locally, in labora-
tories, using a voltage probe and an oscilloscope as depicted
by the direct physical access attack path in Figure 1. These
attacks target secure integrated circuits, such as smart-cards
or cryptographic accelerators embedded in SoCs. SCA coun-
termeasures such as masking, jitter or shuffling [42, 44] are
usually implemented in such secure devices. It encourages the
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usage of high resolution and high sampling rate oscilloscopes
on the attacker side to outperform the countermeasures.
Because traditional hardware attacks are assumed local
and expensive, a large number of electronic devices are not
prepared to withstand remote hardware attack scenarios. For
this reason, even with limited performances, digital and analog
integrated sensors may manage to jeopardize the security
of devices ranging from IoT components to cloud servers
(remote access in Figure 2). With the advent of these software-
induced hardware attacks that do not require either direct
physical access to the target or specific equipment, the alleged
hardware attack limitations are called into question or even
removed.
2.2 On-Chip Voltage Sensing
Two families of sensors enable malicious on-chip voltage
sensing: either delay sensors built with digital logic gates
which aim at measuring fluctuations in the power consump-
tion through delay variations [45,46], or analog sensors using
ADCs usually embedded in MCUs [13, 30]. Until this work,
digital sensors dedicated to SCAs have been exclusively im-
plemented in FPGAs. Their available programmable logic
makes it possible to design and tune such delay sensors in
order to measure the power consumption of a device. We de-
scribe hereafter the principles of these delay sensors as their
working principle is similar to the delay-line components we
used.
Delay-based voltage sensors leverage a side-effect of volt-
age fluctuations over digital logic behavior, which is the re-
lationship between the time taken by a signal to propagate
through a digital logic gate and the on-chip voltage level: an
increase of the gate’s power supply translates into a shorten-
ing of its propagation delay, and respectively a reduction of
the voltage induces an increase of its propagation delay [12].
As a result, measuring the variations of the propagation de-
lay of logic gates provides an image of their voltage supply
variations. Temperature and capacitive effects also play a sig-
nificant part in the propagation delay equation [12]. Unlike
voltage, the propagation delay can be directly measured using
digital logic. Commonly used FPGA-based sensors are the
Ring-Oscillator (RO) based sensors and the Time-to-Digital
Converters (TDC).
RO-based sensor consists in a feedback circuit made of
one or several cascaded inverter gates [45]. If the number of
inverter gates is odd, the circuit naturally oscillates with a
period defined by the total propagation delay of the inverter
gates. When the on-chip voltage increases, the oscillation
frequency increases and vice-versa. A counter can be attached
to the RO to measure its frequency and obtain an image of
the chip voltage [43].
For its part, the TDC-based sensor operates using a delay-
line. A delay-line consists in a chain of cascaded logic ele-
ments (or delay elements) in which a clock signal propagates.
Each delay element forming the delay-line has the same prop-
agation delay and has its output connected to a sampling
register. At each clock rising edge, the delay-line state is cap-
tured by the sampling register. Then, the voltage level can
be deduced from the content of the sampling register (more
specifically from the position of the reconstructed clock wave-
form [14, 15]). If the clock signal propagates faster through
the delay-line (voltage increase), its edges will shift right in
the capture register. Otherwise, if the voltage decreases, the
clock propagation will be slowed down and its edges will shift
left. The resolution offered by TDC-based sensors depends on
the propagation delay of the elements forming the delay-line.
By now, they offer the best resolution and sampling rate for
FPGA-based attacks [16, 34].
2.3 Related Works
In 2018, Schellenberg et al. demonstrated that FPGA-based
sensors were precise enough to be used for SCAs on public
and secret cryptographic algorithms [34]. To enable this at-
tack, the adversary (a TDC-based delay sensor and its control
logic for power supply measurement) and the victim (an AES
hardware encryption block) needed to be located within the
same FPGA. We define it as an FPGA-to-FPGA attack. The
associated threat model targets multi-user FPGA cloud ser-
vices that may appear over the next few years [8]. Later the
same year, it was proven that this attack can be reproduced
between two different FPGAs soldered on the same board and
connected to the same power supply [35]. This time both the
sensors and the algorithms were located in different FPGAs
extending the threat model to inter-chip attacks (although the
board was tampered with to enhance the leakage). The same
year, Zhao et al. disclosed that power SCAs can be conducted
on heterogeneous platforms that include both an application
processor and an FPGA fabric on the same silicon die. As a
proof of concept, they were able to successfully retrieve the
secret key of a custom RSA implementation running within a
CPU core [43]. To do so, they carried out an SPA attack using
RO-based voltage sensors implemented in the FPGA fabric.
Then, this FPGA-to-CPU attack was extended further using
TDC-based voltage sensors and launched against open-source
and deployed AES implementations by [15].
Until 2019, remote power SCA remained bounded to FPGA
devices or heterogeneous SoCs embedding an FPGA fabric as
its flexibility allowed the implementation of powerful sensors.
Two works went beyond the FPGA by proving that on-chip
power SCAs can be carried out in microcontroller devices
[13, 30]. These attacks use ADCs as a straightforward way
to measure on-chip power supply level. Thanks to a leakage
of the chip power consumption into this analog block, the
ADC can substitute the voltage probe role. Even with an
extremely limited sampling rate, this noise sampling method
was successful in retrieving the secret keys used by real world
software and hardware AES cryptographic libraries.
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Figure 3: Typical SoC connectivity with external memory
devices. Depending on the memory bus speed, Delay-Locked-
Loops (DLL) or Delay-Line-blocks (DL) are implemented
to synchronize clock and data signals arrival in the different
memory controllers.
3 Delay-Lines in High-End SoC Devices
Delay-line-based sensors were previously used in FPGA de-
vices as a way to monitor chip power consumption (TDC
sensor). Despite offering great performance, these sensors
were limited to configurable logic which is rarely integrated
in SoC devices. In this section, we disclose that digital and
analog delay-lines are widely implemented in SoC memory
controllers. We present them and discuss their potential use
as voltage sensors (delay sensors).
3.1 Memory Controller Basics
Because high-end SoCs are designed to run operating systems
(Linux, Android, etc.), they require a significant amount of
Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) to store the OS and Random-
Access-Memory (RAM) to efficiently load it. Due to tech-
nological constraints, these SoCs do not embed a significant
amount of RAM nor NVM memory but are rather intercon-
nected with external memories (memory cards, FLASH mem-
ory, SDRAM memory, etc). Thus, depending on the form-
factor, speed and memory size constraints, designers can
choose between a wide range of external memory devices. A
typical scenario of a SoC using external memories is depicted
in Figure 3.
Several memory controllers are required to interface the
SoC with its external memories. Each memory controller acts
as a request arbiter, a transaction scheduler and as a phys-
ical interface to manage data flowing from the SoC to the
memory, and vice-versa. In embedded systems, for cost and
efficiency reasons, the memory controller is more likely to
be directly integrated as a part of the SoC. At the edge of the
memory controller, a physical controller (dotted lines in Fig-
ure 3) outputs and captures the signals that will flow between
the SoC I/Os and the memory device I/Os (clock, data, con-
figuration signals, etc.). The physical controller also ensures
that these signals arrive on time regardless of the intercon-
nection tracks length on the PCB, the voltage and the temper-
ature fluctuations. To better understand the extent of mem-
ory signal propagation timings, we draw a simple example
of SoC/Synchronous Dynamic-RAM (SDRAM) association.
When a read operation is initiated by the SoC, the external
SDRAM memory outputs the requested data edge-aligned
with a clock signal (strobe) later dedicated to data sampling.
Depending on the PCB tracks length, the clock signal is likely
to shift ahead of the data signals, leading then to a sampling
error. To mitigate this effect, the SoC physical controller im-
plements delay-line-based components (delay-locked-loop
DLL and programmable delay-block DL in Figure 3) to cal-
ibrate the phase alignment between the sampling clock and
the data signals. This calibration can be manual and made
once and for all after testing at manufacturing or performed
at each chip power-up. It can also be adjusted dynamically
to counterbalance any misalignment due to power supply or
temperature fluctuations.
The relationship between the delay applied and the SoC
voltage fluctuations drew our interest. In the following para-
graphs, we present two different delay-line-based mechanisms
that can be used to generate these delays for low and high-
bandwidth external memory applications.
3.2 Delay-blocks in Low-Bandwidth Memory
Controllers
In relatively low-bandwidth external memories such as flash
memories, SD cards and multimedia cards, the impact of
voltage and temperature fluctuations is considered not sig-
nificant enough to jeopardize the communication integrity:
dynamic calibration is not required. Delay-lines (DL in Fig-
ure 4) are nonetheless used to mitigate the impact of the PCB
track length on the data and clock signals propagation timings
(these delays are not predictable by SoC designers, they are
set only at board design time). As track lengths are fixed,
a static delay is sufficient to ensure good operation. For a
read transaction, the delay-line is typically calibrated in or-
der to add a phase shift of 90◦ to the clock signal. Thus, it
ensures that data signals are in place when sampling occurs.
The delay-line calibration is carried out through a series of
training steps. These training steps modify the delay of the
elements forming the chain and, for each configuration, verify
if the external memory has been properly read. If the train-
ing is successful, the delay-line configuration is saved in a
dedicated register and remains unchanged until the next test.
Several SoC vendors provide user programmable delay-
blocks as a way for developers to be able to use a wide range
of memory chips or cards with different bus speeds. Unlike
traditional static delay-lines, these delay-blocks come with
both a complete calibration toolkit and a detailed documen-
tation. Figure 4 illustrates the delay-block structure that was
observed in one of the SoC we benchmarked. Its purpose
is to delay the clock signal with respect to the data signals
when a read operation is conducted. The block consists in a
simple delay-line associated with a set of control and status
registers. A Command Register controls the delay t of all the
4
Figure 4: An example of delay-block used in low-bandwidth
memory controllers.
Figure 5: An example of delay-locked-loop used in high-
bandwidth memory controllers.
delay-line elements and thus the phase shift added to the clk
signal. To ensure that the phase shift obtained is conform to
the applied command, a state register captures the output of
each element forming the delay-line every time a clkin rising
edge event occurs. Then, a specific training is performed to
verify whether the captured pattern matches the command or
not.
Despite some missing parts, this structure is reminiscent of
that of a TDC as the delay-line state is continuously captured
and stored in an accessible register. In section 6, we demon-
strate that this delay-block can be turned into a voltage sensor
and hijacked to perform a power SCA.
3.3 DLLs in High-Bandwidth Memory Con-
trollers
Because of the continuous increasing in memory bus speeds,
the available slack time for data sampling is gradually shrink-
ing. Double data rate memories (DDR) such as SDRAM
memory perform one data transfer per clock edge (both rising
and falling) while reaching gigahertz frequencies [33]. On
these devices, the data sampling is very likely to get corrupted
by temperature and voltage variations. This time, a static de-
lay source is not suitable to ensure correct operations. To
effectively cancel voltage and temperature noise side-effects,
a dynamic way to adapt the clock delay has to be considered.
Delay Locked Loops (DLLs) are generally used in recent
DDR memory controllers to dynamically track and control
the phase shift applied between the sampling clock and the
external memory (e.g. SDRAM) data signals [2, 9]. As illus-
trated in Figure 5, a DLL has two main blocks: a delay-line,
and a feedback circuit. The delay-line is calibrated to provide
a phase shift to a clk signal using both coarse and fine delay
elements. However, the propagation delay jitter associated
with on-chip voltage and temperature fluctuations is likely
to skew the applied phase. This is why a DLL includes a
feedback circuit to tune the delay-line in order to provide
a dynamic control of the phase shift and thus, counterbal-
ance voltage and temperature variations. The feedback circuit
comes with a phase detector that compares the phase shift
between the clock signal at the input of the delay-line, clkin,
and its phase-shifted clock output, clkout . Then, according to
the measured error, a delay controller applies a correction in
order to "deskew" the result, that is, to get back to the ini-
tial delay. The applied correction modifies the delay of the
elements forming the delay-line and can be either analog or
digital-controlled depending on the delay-line type [1].
A command register stores the delay settings, it is memory-
mapped and hence can be read from the SoC AP or MCU
cores. The DLL operates autonomously, this means that
through a simple access to this register, a process can retrieve
the state of the DLL, which shall be correlated to on-chip
voltage and temperature variations. As a result, tracking the
command register content shall provide an image of the SoC
power consumption that may be used to carry out SCAs. Note
that this measurement methodology (tracking the command
of a feedback dynamically controlled system) differs from
that described in Section 3.2 for delay-blocks (sampling a
clock signal propagating inside a fixed delay-line). If this
unusual measurement medium provides enough resolution
and sampling rate to eavesdrop power consumption of secure
applications running on a processor, this could represent an
important backdoor for computer security. This hypothetical
vulnerability is strengthened by the fact that this attack only
requires a read access to the command register, no configura-
tion steps are required. This attack scenario is developed in
section 5.
4 Experimental Setup
This section describes the tested devices and the attacked
algorithm. We also detail the adopted threat model and intro-
duce the three attack scenarios that will be developed in the
remaining of the paper.
4.1 Tested Devices
Two devices from two different SoC providers have been
studied in our experiments. The first target considered in this
work comes with a dual-core Cortex-A9 application processor
(AP). It is a typical multi-purpose SoC providing many addi-
tional resources: I/O, ADCs, bus controllers, etc. It supports
DDR2-DDR3, Flash and SD/MMC external memories and
provides several DLL blocks to interface properly with DDR
external memories. The experiments made on this target have
been conducted without using an OS: we denote it as a bare
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Figure 6: Basic principle of the three core-vs-core attack variants proposed in this work. It shows the leakage path from the
victim process to the delay sensor and the sensor data flow retrieved by the attack process.
metal attack. This configuration makes SCA easier as there
are fewer interruptions (with respect to the case in which an
OS is used) that may disturb the attack and victim processes
and cause synchronization issues.
The second target embeds a dual-core Cortex-A7 AP as-
sociated with a Cortex-M processor (MCU). It also supports
DDR2-DDR3, Flash and SD/MMC external memories and
embeds several DLL blocks. Additionally, it provides user
programmable delay-blocks that can be employed for inter-
facing low bandwidth memory (e.g. an SD card). These pro-
grammable delay-blocks are the second case we studied. The
experiments done on this SoC have been carried out with a
Linux OS running on its AP (i.e. the Cortex-A7 processor).
The results are those of a Linux OS attack.
The following papers provide detailed information about
memory controller architectures and implementations in sev-
eral SoC devices [2,10,26,28,29,41]. To reproduce the results
presented in our work, delay-line-based components have to
be identified. A keyword research can be launched on the SoC
reference manual to highlight them (e.g. "DLL", "delay-line",
"delay", "coarse", "fine", "dqs ratio","PVT", etc.). Next, the
research area may be reduced by selecting only the registers
that hold delay information. Finally the procedures applied in
Sections 5 and 6 can be followed to perform a SCA attack.
4.2 OpenSSL AES Architecture
The OpenSSL library [31] provides several cryptographic al-
gorithms used for securing channels over computer networks.
In this work, we focus on the OpenSSL AES-128 (version
1.1.1) that implements a 32-bit tabulated version of the text-
book AES encryption algorithm [11]. This variant merges
the Mixcolumn and SubBytes transformations into 4 pre-
computed look-up tables known as T-tables (256 x 32-bit) as
a way to optimize the computations on 32-bit processors.
4.3 Threat Model
In this work, we introduce three core-vs-core attack scenarios
in order to assess the SCA capabilities of the delay-line-based
sensors. For each scenario depicted in Figure 6, we first deploy
a cryptographic application (in green) within a processor
core. This application located either in the AP or in the MCU
allows the end-user to launch AES encryptions/decryptions,
with the plaintexts/ciphertexts that he provides. Secondly, we
introduce a malicious user (in red) that has the privilege level
necessary to access the delay-line blocks presented in Section
3 and that uses them to retrieve the leakage induced by the
AES application.
Although not used in this research work, Trusted Execution
Environment (TEE) and TrustZone [2] architecture stand as
potential realistic targets for the delay-lines. TrustZone at-
tacks from the normal-world to the secure-world have been
widely covered in recent remote attack works [6, 30, 32, 36].
However, from a side-channel point of view, the current Trust-
Zone does not provide any countermeasures. Thus, the ability
of an attacker to turn our feasibility attack into an end-to-end
TrustZone attack is reasonably expected.
In the remainder of the paper, the three scenarios presented
are referred to as:
1. A DLL-based attack (see Figure 6.a), or AP-vs-AP at-
tack, that demonstrates the ability of a DLL to serve as
a power supply sensor suitable for a CPA attack against
the AES algorithm. In this scenario, one core of the
Cortex-A9 AP runs the AES victim application, while
the second core executes the attack process (both victim
and aggressor processes are C programs, in bare metal
mode). The attacker code is in charge of collecting the
leakage data of the AES. It does so by configuring the ac-
cess to the DLL command register that makes it possible
to sample its values during AES encryptions performed
by the first core. The attacker core is also in charge of
providing the plaintext to be ciphered by the victim pro-
cess and to trigger both the encryption and readback of
DLL states. This AP-vs-AP attack scenario is described
in details in Section 5.
2. A first Delay-Block-based attack (see Figure 6.b), or
MCU-vs-AP attack, where the victim process is ran on
the Cortex-A7 AP (a C code AES running on top of
6
a Linux OS) and the attack process is executed by the
Cortex-M MCU (a C program, in bare metal mode). In
this scenario the MCU is in charge of calibrating and
using a delay-block to eavesdrop the activity of the AP.
This MCU-vs-AP attack scenario is addressed in Section
6.
3. A secondDelay-Block-based attack (see Figure 6.c), or
AP-vs-MCU attack, that matches a typical state-of-the-
art industrial case where the cryptographic and security
operations of a SoC embedding AP cores are delegated
to a less complex MCU core. In this scenario the AP
core (Cortex-A7) runs the attack process while the MCU
core (Cortex-M) runs the AES victim process. This AP-
vs-MCU attack scenario is reported in Section 6.
5 DLL-based Power Side-Channel Attack
This section presents a novel way to monitor on-chip voltage
and temperature fluctuations using the DLLs embedded in
DDR memory controllers. Then, an associated attack model
is disclosed, where an attacker leverages these entities to
eavesdrop the activity of a victim process (OpenSSL AES).
The experiments were conducted on the bare-metal dual core
Cortex-A9 SoC.
5.1 Validating DLL Effectiveness:Monitoring
Temperature
As a proof of concept, a simple experiment was carried-out
on the Cortex-A9 SoC to confirm that the DLL command (see
Figure 5) is actually tracking the SoC package temperature
variations. If so, considering the digital gate propagation delay
equation [12], the same behaviour should arise with power
supply fluctuations.
The test uses a C program designed to continuously read
and store the DLL command register content into an acqui-
sition array for a period of 30 seconds. Simultaneously, a
cooling spray was used at specific moments to cool down the
SoC package. To limit the acquisition size, each array index
contains the average of 1,000 successive DLL readings.
Figure 7 reports the evolution of the measured DLL com-
mand (y-axis) as a function of time (x-axis). Each spray shot
induces a temperature drop (translated into a DLL command
drop in Figure 7) that progressively recovers until the next
one. This simple experiment confirms that a DLL is suitable
to dynamically track the SoC temperature variations. As the
temperature decreases, the propagation speed of the clk signal
through the delay-line increases [12]. Thus, the phase-shift
between clkin and clkout progressively drifts. To counterbal-
ance this effect, the DLL dynamically adapts its command in
order to maintain a constant phase shift.
Because package temperature evolves relatively slowly, the
sampling frequency for this experiment was limited to 300
Figure 7: DLL response to sudden temperature drops induced
by three successive exposition of the SoC to a cooling spray.
kHz. However, as this paper focuses on power side-channel,
which itself depends on transient voltage drops measurements,
a higher sampling rate needs to be achieved: it is the subject
of the next subsection 5.2.
5.2 Improving Sampling Rate and Synchroni-
sation using DMA
As mentioned before, the DLL command value can be directly
accessed through its memory address. Then, a loop associated
with an array can be added to collect more samples. This CPU-
based sampling method works in principle but has several
drawbacks:
First, it requires a constant time between each acquisition.
If this constant time is not achieved, the samples won’t be
correctly aligned. Consequently, statistical attacks will be
less accurate as the averaging of several acquisitions will
suffer from de-synchronisation. Achieving constant time is
feasible in bare metal applications because they rarely suffer
from interruptions. However, if the application runs over an
operating system, interrupts will dramatically affect the timing
of acquisitions and make their averaging impossible. The
second limitation is related to the achievable sampling rate.
Indeed, the delay induced by CPU memory access plus the
storage of the acquired data into an array is not optimal. Using
this method on the Cortex-A9 SoC, the sampling frequency
was limited to 2.2 MHz.
To solve these issues, we choose to use Direct Memory
Access (DMA) in order to improve the sampling rate as well
as the synchronisation of our samples (as proposed in [13]).
A DMA is a hardware module able to transfer data from a
peripheral to another without processor intervention. For this
reason, it is faster in transmitting data, but also not affected
by OS interrupts. The source address (address from which
the DMA should sample the data) is the register containing
the DLL command. The destination address (destination of
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Algorithm 1 Dual core Cortex-A9 attack, AP#0 attack
pseudo-algorithm
Input: Nbacq, Nbsample
DMAinit();
UARTinit();
while Nbacq has not been reached do
Send AES plaintext to AP#1;
Launch DMA transfer(Nbsample);
Send StartAES to AP#1;
Wait for EndAES flag();
Wait for EndDMA flag();
Export samples through UART;
end while
the DMA transfer) is the base address of an array whose size
depends on the number of samples required. At the end of the
DMA transfer, an interrupt flag is set and ends the sampling
process. With DMA up and running, we improved the DLL
sampling rate from 2.2 MHz to 16 MHz.
5.3 Bare Metal OpenSSL AES Attack Setup
According to the threat model we consider (see subsection
4.3), the attack process shall be able (1) to trigger the start of
an AES encryption by the victim process, and (2) to control
the gathering of the leakage from the AES through a DLL-
based voltage sensor. Our test bench includes two processes
(their pseudo codes are given in Algorithms 1 and 2) executed
by the two application cores of our target in bare metal mode:
the attack process on AP#0 and the victim process on AP#1.
The victim program starts by an initialization step (the AES
round keys are derived from the secret key), denoted AESinit(),
and then enters an infinite loop waiting for the inputs of the
attack program (Wait for StartAES flag()). The initial-
ization step of the attack process consists in setting the config-
uration of the DMA access to the DLL command register (in
order to retrieve dynamically the values it contains which are
correlated to the AES calculations), denoted DMAinit(), and in
setting the serial communication with a control PC UARTinit()
to retrieve these values and the plaintext (used for conducting
a first round CPA attack). The CPA attack we carried out re-
quires to encrypt Nbacq plaintexts and to gather the associated
leakage. The attack program then enters a while loop with
Nbacq iterations. Each loop consists in: (1) sending the plain-
text to the victim process (Send AES plaintext to AP#1),
(2) starting the automated DMA access to the DLL command
register (Launch DMA transfer) to retrieve Nbsample times
its content, (3) trigger the AES encryption (Send StartAES
flag() to AP#1), (4) wait for the current encryption and
DMA access to be completed (Wait for EndAES flag()
and Wait for EndDMA flag()), and (5) to send the obtained
leakage data and the plaintext to the control PC (Export
samples through UART). Data transfers (plaintexts, cipher-
Algorithm 2 Dual core Cortex-A9 attack, AP#1 victim
pseudo-algorithm
Input: AESkey,AESplaintext
AESinit();
while infinity do
Wait for StartAES flag();
Get AP#0 plaintext;
OpenSSL AES encrypt();
Send EndAES flag to AP#0;
Send AES ciphertext to AP#0;
end while
texts, flags) between both processes are done through a shared
memory space in RAM. On the victim side, the while loop
synchronizes the AES encryptions (denoted OpenSSL AES
encrypt()) with the request of a novel encryption and the
delivery of a novel plaintext (Wait for StartAES flag()
and Get AP#0 plaintext) by the attack process. It also sig-
nals the end of the encryption (Send EndAES flag to AP#0)
and provides the attack program with the obtained ciphertext
(Send AES ciphertext to AP#0).
In addition to this attack setup, we used embedded hard-
ware performance counters to precisely measure the duration
of an AES encryption. On average, an encryption took 837
AP clock cycles or 1,25 µs at a frequency of 667 MHz (both
attack and victim programs were compiled with the optimiza-
tion parameter set to -O2). The DMA transfer method we
used provides a constant 62.5 ns sampling period (i.e. a 16
MHz sampling frequency). As a result, 21 samples of the
DLL command are gathered per AES encryption.
5.4 AP-vs-AP CPA Attack Results
The bottom part of Figure 8 illustrates the results of two ex-
periments conducted to assess the AES encryption impact on
the DLL command value and precisely detect its encryption
time window. The two traces depicted in black (1st case) and
red (2nd case) represent the averaged DLL command value
(y-axis) obtained for 1,000 acquisitions as a function of time
(expressed in DMA samples). For the first experiment (in
black), the victim program was kept idle during the entirety
of the DMA sampling operations. The DLL command drop
visible between sample 0 and 1,000 was induced by the extra
power consumption linked to the DMA module activation.
The DLL applied a strong correction to maintain a constant
phase shift, that was finally relaxed as the power consumption
returned to normal (sample 2,000 to the end of sampling). The
second case (in red) reports an actual iteration of the attack
and victim processes when an AES encryption is done. The
red trace experienced the same DLL command undershoot
due to DMA module activation (sample 0 to 1,000) but also
a second undershoot corresponding to the AES encryption
(starting at sample 4,500). It is finally restored to a steady
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Figure 8: DLL-based attack results: the bottom part repre-
sents the overall impact of an AES encryption on the DLL
command value. The top part zooms on the AES encryption
windows and provides the temporal correlation rate for two
key bytes.
value lower than the initial one (sample 6,000 to the end of
sampling). The AES encryption window was deduced from
the position of the second DLL command drop. Based on this
information the CPA attack could be conducted on a smaller
amount of samples.
We launched a total number of 20 million AES encryp-
tions and acquired 200 DLL command samples per encryp-
tion. Samples and plaintexts extraction through UART took
around 8 hours at 921,600 bauds. Then, an external com-
puter was used to apply post-processing to the traces and
conduct the CPA attack. The top part of Figure 8 depicts a
filtered and averaged trace of the DLL command (in red).
High-pass filtering was used as a way to reduce the impact
of low frequency variations (induced for instance by temper-
ature fluctuations) on the acquired traces and thus to reduce
the number of traces required for the attack. Then, we per-
formed a plaintext-based CPA attack on the first round of
the AES. As we mentioned earlier the OpenSSL AES uses
T-tables to upgrade its performances on 32-bit processors.
This allows us to leverage a 32-bit T-tables output prediction:
HW [Ttable(key⊕ plaintext)]. The obtained correlation results
versus the time are represented above the averaged trace in
Figure 8 (for two key bytes). The correct key hypotheses are
depicted in red and emerge from the incorrect hypotheses (in
grey) at sample 120. Based on 20 million encryptions, we
achieved a full AES key recovery. 3 bytes were retrieved in
the range 0-5M traces, 2 between 5-10M million, 5 between
10-15M an 4 between 15-20M. The key bytes number 7 and
9 never completely emerged from the incorrect candidates,
but we assume that a simple brute force can be conducted to
retrieve their values. The progressive correlation of the first 8
key bytes plus the failed byte #9 are depicted in Figure 13 in
the appendix.
Figure 9: Effect of on-chip power consumption variations on
the sampled delay values.
5.5 Conclusion on DLL-based SCA
In this section, we demonstrated that a DLL can be used to
monitor on-chip temperature and power supply fluctuations.
To that end, we leveraged a memory-mapped register which
continuously stores the actual DLL command applied to con-
trol the delay-line. Through a simple C program, we were
able to perform multiple read accesses to the DLL command
register and thus to precisely record an image of the actual
on-chip voltage level.
This unconventional voltage sensor was then used to con-
duct a power SCA on an OpenSSL AES algorithm imple-
mented in the Cortex-A9 application processor and a full
AES key recovery was achieved (with the help of brute force
for the two remaining bytes). Performance, limitations and
potential countermeasures regarding this attack are discussed
in Section 7.
6 Delay-Block-based Power Side-Channel At-
tack
The DLL-based attack presented in Section 5 was associated
with the use of DDR external memories such as SDRAM in
AP-based SoC. Apart from SDRAM, other types of memories
such as NVM memories are also mandatory for these devices
and also require the use of delay-lines to synchronize their
data transfers. This section discloses a second attack path that
allows the hijacking of a programmable delay-block and its
malicious use to perform core-vs-core power SCAs. These
experiments are conducted on the second target we considered.
It is based on a dual core Cortex-A7 AP and a Cortex-M
MCU.
6.1 From Delay-Block to TDC Sensor
The Cortex-A7 SoC studied in this section comes with several
programmable delay-blocks capable of working with differ-
ent types of external memories (Flash, SDIO, MMC). Their
settings can be adjusted depending on the bus speeds of the
external memories used. They aim at adjusting the phase of
the clock signal in order to ensure a reliable exchange of
data by tuning a programmable clock delay. Figure 9 depicts
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Figure 10: Delay-block response to sudden processor activity
increases induced by strcmp computations.
the 12 elements delay-line provided by the SoC delay-block
(top part) and the capture register (bottom part) designed to
monitor the state of the output nodes of every delay element
(it is highlighted by dotted lines in Figure 9). When a clkin
rising edge occurs, the capture register takes a snapshot of the
delay-line. This snapshot contains an image (represented as a
waveform in Figure 9) of the clock propagation through the
delay line. The propagation delay t of the elementary delay
elements can be set using a dedicated register. If this delay is
set to its minimum the delay-line width (acquisition window)
is small. Thus, only a part of the clock signal can be captured.
By gradually increasing t, the clock signal observation can be
extended, possibly to several periods.
We leveraged this t parameter to make the delay-block sen-
sitive to on-chip voltage fluctuations. To that end, we took a
significant number of delay-line snapshots for each of the 128
possible t delay values. A vast majority of them gave stable
results; which means that the captured image remained sta-
ble between successive register readings. For a few however,
delay variations arose between subsequent captures. This in-
teresting behavior can be explained by (1) on-chip voltage
fluctuations that affect the clock propagation time through the
delay elements, and (2) by the fact that several delay values t
naturally position the clock edges in unstable places within
the delay line (i.e. in between two delay elements). Figure
9 displays three waveforms (delay-line snapshots) obtained
with such a t setting. In this configuration, three clock periods
stand in the entire delay line. From top to bottom we have:
(1) the steady state register waveform which stands as our
reference (it outputs a 0x666 reference value), (2) a slowed
down waveform that can be obtained due to a supply voltage
decrease (it outputs a 0x64c), and (3) an accelerated wave-
form that can be obtained due to a supply voltage increase
(it outputs a 0x262). In our experiments, the three obtained
hexadecimal digits are weighted and added to translate into
an image of the voltage supply (as if they were sampled from
three separate TDCs).
6.2 Validating Delay-Block Effectiveness:
strcmp test
To validate the delay-block effectiveness as a voltage measure-
ment unit, we ran a simple program in the SoC Cortex-M core
that induces a programmable level of core activity, thus creat-
ing different levels of power consumption. It successively al-
ternates between low-power demanding empty for loops and
high-power demanding string comparison functions: strcmp.
The number of characters for the string comparison and the
number of increments in the loop were chosen so that they
roughly take the same amount of time.
At the same time, the program uses the SoC integrated
DMA in burst mode to sample the delay-block capture reg-
ister. On this device we identified that a single 32-bit DMA
memory transfer from the delay-block to the SDRAM takes
around 65.8 ns, thus we obtained a 15.2 MHz sampling rate.
Figure 10 displays the averaged delay value (y-axis) obtained
for 5,000 acquisitions as a function of time (expressed in
DMA samples). When the program moves from empty for
loops to strcmp functions (and vice-versa), a clear delay shift
appears. The strcmp operation generates a voltage drop, that
is translated into a delay increase. It goes back to a lower level
during the for loops. The modulation between two delay val-
ues has been induced by two different power consumption
levels. This validates the ability of the delay-block to monitor
the SoC power consumption variations (note that we could
also have used the temperature monitoring technique intro-
duced in subsection 5.1). The following subsections describe
how it can be used to conduct a CPA attack.
6.3 Linux-based OpenSSL AES Attack Setup
Similarly to the attack setup described in subsection 5.3, we
used the OpenSSL AES implementation to evaluate the threat
posed by delay-block-based SCAs. Our SoC target embeds
both a dual core AP and a MCU that makes it possible to
test the MCU-vs-AP and AP-vs-MCU attack scenarios in-
troduced in subsection 4.3. Depending on the scenario, the
attack and victim processes were ran either on the AP core or
on the MCU core. Here, we consider the MCU-vs-AP attack
to describe our attack setup.
On the victim’s side (here the Cortex-A7 AP), a C program
similar to the one used for the DLL-based attack is deployed
(see algorithm 2). The victim first performs the AES key
schedule and then enters an infinite loop where it remains in
wait state. Each AES request launched by the MCU brings
out the victim process from wait state and triggers an AES
encryption. Eventually, the victim sends back the end flag
and the computed ciphertext to the MCU before returning to
wait state.
On the adversary’s side (here the MCU), delay-block cali-
bration and use of Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs)
were added to the initial algorithm. HPCs are used to accu-
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Figure 11: AP-vs-MCU attack results: the bottom part rep-
resents the averaged AES power consumption, the top part
provides the correlation rates as a function of time for four
AES key bytes.
rately time the successive encryptions and to mitigate the
de-synchronisation brought by the Linux OS. For each acqui-
sition, the number of cycles elapsed during the encryption
is compared to a maximal limit Nbcycle set by the adversary
above which the entire acquisition is discarded. Prior to the
attack, a preliminary test was conducted in order to identify
the optimal value for Nbcycle (assuming that a lower number
of clock cycles corresponds to a lower number of interrupts).
Hence, by launching thousands of AES encryptions, we were
able to find a reference number of clock cycles for almost
interrupt-free encryptions. Then, based on this reference, we
set a maximal limit Nbcycle beyond which we decided to dis-
card the acquisitions. This maximal limit is the sum of the
minimal reference plus an arbitrary number of cycles. To
properly choose this number, a trade-off was made between
de-synchronization limitation and proportion of traces dis-
carded. Putting Nbcycle too close to the minimal reference
value will induce the discarding of a large part of the ac-
quisitions, putting it too far will results in the acquisition of
de-synchronized traces. The following results were obtained
with Nbcycle set to 30 cycles more than the minimal reference
value. By doing so, at least half of the total acquisitions were
retained and used for the subsequent CPA calculations.
As already mentioned in Section 5, the use of DMA consid-
erably improves the achievable sampling rate and the samples
synchronisation. Here, both cores leverage the same DMA
module as it is the only one available in the SoC. The DMA
was initialized from the MCU core in both scenarios. In the
AP-vs-MCU attack, the AP core first asks the MCU to initial-
ize the DMA, then to perform the encryptions. An alternative
to MCU-based DMA initialization would have been to launch
it directly from the AP Linux userland through the develop-
ment of a user space DMA driver. While this would probably
have been closer to a real attack scenario, this additional de-
velopment wouldn’t have brought any additional insight from
a security standpoint and we then chose the other way around
for ease of coding.
Figure 12: MCU-vs-AP attack results: the bottom part rep-
resents the averaged AES power consumption. The top part
provides the correlation over the time results over four AES
key bytes.
In the AP-vs-MCU scenario, we needed full access to the
HPC and the delay-block configuration registers from the AP.
However, memory protection and virtual addressing prevent
a Linux user from doing it directly. To make this possible
from the userland, we used mmapping to map and obtain a
valid virtual address space for the required devices [5]. This
operation requires root privileges.
6.4 AP-vs-MCU Attack Results
In the AP-vs-MCU attack scenario, the OpenSSL AES pro-
gram runs within the Cortex-M MCU. Using compiler opti-
mization set to -O0, 1,460 clock cycles are required to perform
a single AES encryption, that is 7.3 µs at the MCU operat-
ing frequency (200 MHz). Figure 11 displays in its bottom
part the averaged delay value obtained for a time window of
250 DMA samples (or 16.4 µs) over 10 million acquisitions.
The AES encryption, which approximately covers 110 DMA
samples, is surrounded by two empty for loops added for
visualisation ease. The top part of Figure 11 provides the
CPA correlation rates of four key bytes (of index #1, #13, #9,
and #5) as a function of time. The correct key hypotheses
are depicted in red and emerge from the incorrect hypotheses
(in grey) between samples 70 and 80. We chose to represent
these key bytes because they are equally distant regarding the
OpenSSL byte computation order: 0 5 10 15 - 4 9 14 3 - 8
13 2 7 - 12 1 6 11. This explains the regular temporal offset
observed between them. Based on 10 million encryptions, we
achieved a full AES key recovery. 6 bytes were retrieved in
the range 0-2M traces, 4 between 2-6M and 6 between 6-10M.
The progressive correlation of the eight last AES key bytes
(#8 to #15) are depicted in Figure 14 in the appendix.
6.5 MCU-vs-AP Attack Results
In the MCU-vs-AP attack scenario, the OpenSSL AES pro-
gram runs in the Cortex-A7 AP. Using compiler optimization
set to -O2, 865 clock cycles are required to perform a single
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Scenario Sensor Type NbAcq f reqDMA f reqTarget Duration
AP-vs-AP DLL 20M 16 MHz 667 MHz ∼ 12 hours
AP-vs-MCU DL 10M 15.2 MHz 200 MHz ∼ 9 hours
MCU-vs-AP DL 40M 15.2 MHz 650 MHz ∼ 24 hours
Table 1: Overall delay-line-based power SCA results.
AES encryption, that is 1.33 µs at the AP operating frequency
(650 MHz). Figure 12 displays in its bottom part the averaged
delay value obtained for a time window of 100 DMA samples
(or 6,6 µs) over 40 million acquisitions. The AES encryption,
which approximately covers 20 DMA samples, is surrounded
by two empty for loops added for visualisation ease. The top
part of Figure 12 provides the temporal correlation rate of four
key bytes as a function of time . The correct key hypotheses
are depicted in red and emerge from the incorrect hypotheses
(in grey) between samples 30 and 40. Again, we chose to
represent these specific key bytes because they are equally
distant in the OpenSSL byte computation order: 0 5 10 15 - 4
9 14 3 - 8 13 2 7 - 12 1 6 11. However, the AES encryption in
the AP is faster than that of the MCU (1.33 µs vs. 7.3 µs) and
the DMA sampling frequency that remained fixed between
the two experiments is no longer sufficient to let the temporal
offsets appear. This limited sampling frequency partly ex-
plains the higher number of acquisitions required to retrieve
some key bytes. For instance, byte #12 in Figure 12, seems
to suffer from the under sampling and gave poorer correla-
tion results (0,07%) than byte #4 (0,32%) or byte #0 (0,29%).
We were able to confirm this assumption through a second
experiment where the AES encryption temporal window had
been slightly shifted regarding the DMA: the AES leakage
was thus sampled at different timings. This experiment gave
better results on several key bytes that struggled to emerge
in the previous attack. Based on 40 million encryptions, we
achieved a full AES key recovery. 3 bytes were retrieved in
the range 0-10M traces, 6 between 10-20M, 2 between 40-
30M, 4 between 30-40M. The 13th key byte never completely
emerged from the incorrect candidates, but we assume that
a simple brute force can be conducted to retrieve its value.
The progressive correlation of the first eight key bytes (0 to
7) plus the failed 13th byte are depicted in Figure 15 in the
appendix.
7 Discussion
Two delay-line-based power measurement techniques, using
a DLL or a delay-block were introduced and studied in this
research work. Because such delay-line-based components
are embedded in almost every high-end digital SoC that uses
external memories, the threat model we introduced is serious
and shall be considered feasible for a large number of complex
SoCs. In this section, we discuss performance, additional
attack scenarios and potential countermeasures regarding the
SideLine attack.
7.1 Performance and Limitations of SideLine
Table 1 summarizes the results obtained for the three attack
scenarios considered in this paper. First, an AP-vs-AP attack
was performed on a Cortex-A9 AP using DLL-based sensors.
As DLLs provide a limited resolution, a large amount of
acquisitions were required to integrate enough information
for the CPA to succeed (20 million traces required for full AES
key recovery). It took around 12 hours to extract the traces,
apply post-processing (filtering) and conduct the CPA attack.
The lack of resolution also made post-synchronization nearly
impossible and thus implied the collection of leakage traces
with a constant synchronization. Apart from performances,
the DLL was by far the simplest sensor to implement in our
experiments, as it only required the reading of a memory-
mapped register. However, care must be taken as in certain
cases, DLLs may require additional calibration. For instance,
some DLLs can either perform delay calibration continuously
or at a set of intervals [2]. Such parameters should be taken
into account by the attacker and calibrated if needed.
The second attack proposed in this paper required a pre-
liminary work to properly turn the delay-block into a custom
TDC. Then, two delay-block-based power SCAs were con-
ducted. The AP-vs-MCU AES attack took around 10 million
traces for a full key recovery (trace extraction and CPA took
approximately 9 hours) while the MCU-vs-AP AES attack
required 40 million traces (24 hours). We can compare these
results to the attack reported in [15] against an OpenSSL AES
implementation in an FPGA-based heterogeneous SoC. In
this work, FPGA-based TDCs were able to perform a similar
attack using only 90,000 traces (FPGA-to-CPU attack). FP-
GAs indeed offer the possibility to design high resolution and
high sampling rate sensors which explain the higher efficiency
of their attack. Such a flexibility is obviously not available
in ASICs. For instance, even using DMA in our experiments,
the maximum sampling rate achieved (16 MHz) was still way
under the FPGA-based TDC sampling rate given in [15] (200
MHz). Additionally delay-blocks also suffer from a poor res-
olution as evidenced in Figure 16 in the appendix. Despite
these limitations, we demonstrated that such an attack is still
feasible without using FPGAs and within a reasonable time
and number of traces.
The presence of DLLs and programmable delay-blocks
is already mandatory in high-end SoC devices and should
become even more prevalent in the future with the constant
increase of memory bus speeds. At the same time, their volt-
age sensing capability will be progressively enhanced as they
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will need to meet higher performances requirements. This
should make SideLine even easier to conduct and detrimental
for hardware security in the future.
7.2 Additional Attack Scenarios
Additionally to our research experiments, other attack scenar-
ios using these SCA vectors can be expected. With the emer-
gence of trusted execution environments like TrustZone [3],
recent processors are now able to isolate specific areas of
memory for security purposes and allow the storage of se-
crets that cannot be accessed by the non-secure world (e.g.
non-secure OS). SideLine may break this isolation by access-
ing delay-lines from the non-secure world and eavesdropping
secure-world activity leakage [23]. The rise of connected de-
vices and cloud services strengthens this threat as SideLine
can be launched remotely. Centralized devices and servers
shared between multiple users may be targeted by malicious
programs intending to monitor the overall device activity
(strcmp example) and more dramatically to steal their secrets
(AES attack example).
Complementary threat models may arise such as the ap-
parition of delay-lines-based hardware Trojans. Indeed, SoC
providers are increasingly outsourcing their integrated circuit
fabrication and expose themselves to the possible insertion
of Trojan circuits [24]. The fact that high-end SoC devices
already use a wide variety of delay-lines makes it easier to
maliciously add a delay-line-based sensor Trojan without
being detected. This entity could be triggered remotely by
evil groups to eavesdrop activity and later extract informa-
tion about device computations. The next paragraph provides
some countermeasure guidelines that could potentially miti-
gate SideLine.
7.3 Hardware & Software Mitigations
Adding SCA Countermeasures: A simple way to make the
victim process more resilient to power SCAs is the addition of
software or hardware SCA countermeasures [42,44]. As men-
tioned above, one of the main limitations of SideLine comes
from the low resolution provided by DLL and delay-blocks.
This forces the attacker to acquire a huge number of traces
(several million in our case) and makes it nearly impossible
to re-synchronize SCA traces. On the victim side, software
randomization could be a good candidate to efficiently de-
synchronize computations and hence to increase significantly
the attack difficulty (e.g. adding random delays in T-Table
computations for OpenSSL AES). On the monitoring side
(delay-line), a straightforward way to mitigate the attack could
rely on the addition of phase and frequency jitter to the clock
signal used for sampling the delay-line registers.
Preventing Delay-Line Access: Another countermeasure
would act at system level by preventing the access to the delay-
line registers by unauthorized software entities. Hence, only
the OS for instance would have access to this resource. Trust-
Zone could also be used to place DLLs and Delay-blocks in
the secure world and make their use by non-secure world im-
possible in practice. Locking the access to the DMA module
or the hardware performance counters would also represent a
significant limitation for the attack setup.
Reducing Delay-Line Sampling Rate: Preventing delay-
line access through privilege rights seems insufficient as a
malicious attacker or a compromised OS could overpass it
(privileges escalation). A hardware way to mitigate the threat
would be to limit the delay-block access to a lower sampling
rate (e.g. 10KHz). This could be simply achieved by limiting
the access rate to the register that stores delay-line informa-
tion. This way, even if the power consumption monitoring
would remain feasible, it will highly affect the delay sensor
performances. With such a limited sampling rate it would be
probably very challenging for an attacker to conduct SCAs
on fast encryption algorithms such as AES.
Abandoning Delay-Lines in SoCs: As SideLine revealed
their potential misuse as power consumption sensors, the
delay-line-based components could be removed from SoC
devices and instead, be placed directly within the external
memory devices. This drastic choice would require the addi-
tion of configuration I/Os in external memories to efficiently
calibrate the delay-lines but will almost entirely remove the
delay-line threat from the SoC die. However, even outside the
SoC, the delay-line threat may remain problematic as inter-
chip power SCAs have already been shown feasible [35].
8 Conclusion
Previous works demonstrated that remote power SCAs were
feasible using FPGA-based delay sensors and microcontroller
ADC-based sensors. SideLine goes further by proving that un-
suspected hardware components available in a broad range of
high-end SoC devices, can be turned into power consumption
measurement units. In this work, we studied two common
SoC resources known as delay-locked-loops and delay-blocks
and proved their capability to eavesdrop the voltage activity of
cryptographic programs running in different processors. Sev-
eral core-vs-core attack scenarios on application processors
and microcontroller units were conducted. For each scenario,
we achieved a full key recovery side-channel attack on the
publicly available OpenSSL AES implementation. We be-
lieve that these findings open a new era for remote power
side-channel attacks. SideLine has the advantage of being
portable on a wide range of devices as it does not requires the
presence of specific circuitry (e.g. FPGA). Because SideLine
feeds upon SoC complexity, we also believe that it represents
a major threat for actual high-end SoC security. More impor-
tantly this threat is likely to scale up in line with the constant
performance improvements in SoCs and memory devices.
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9 Appendix
Figure 13: AP-vs-AP attack scenario - The CPA progression (y-axis) over the number of traces (x-axis) is represented for the
first 8 AES key bytes. Bytes 7th and 9th which never emerged from the incorrect key candidates are also represented. These CPA
results were obtained over 20 million AES encryptions, the correlation rates are provided in the summary table.
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Figure 14: AP-vs-MCU attack scenario - The CPA progression (y-axis) over the number of traces (x-axis) is represented for
the last 8 AES key bytes. The 1st AES key byte is also represented as it provided the best correlation rate. These CPA results
were obtained over 10 million AES encryptions, the correlation rates are provided in the summary table.
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Figure 15: MCU-vs-AP attack scenario - The CPA progression (y-axis) over the number of traces (x-axis) is represented for
the first 8 AES key bytes. Bytes 13th which never emerged from the incorrect key candidates is also represented. These CPA
results were obtained over 40 million AES encryptions, the correlation rates are provided in the summary table.
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Figure 16: MCU-vs-AP attack scenario: This figure illustrates the delay-block resolution limitation when a single AES
encryption is acquired (a). This resolution can be virtually increased by averaging a higher number of traces: 5 (b), 10 (c) and
100 (d) traces.
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